摘要，就是你整篇论文的精华，首先要确定论文的方向，做到心中有数，整篇论文的大纲都在里面取其精华！
论文摘要又称文摘，是论文的重要组成部分，它是以提供文献内容梗概为目的，不加评论和补充解释，简明、确切地记述文献重要内容的短文。摘要应具有独立性和自明性，并拥有与文献同等量的主要信息，即不需阅读全文，就可获得重要的信息。摘要通常置于文题之后，文章之首。在论文发表后，论文摘要常被文献检索系统所收集。
摘要由目的、方法、结果和结论四部分组成。目的部分应简要说明研究的目的，说明提出问题的缘由，表明研究的范围及重要性；方法部分应说明研究课题的基本设计，使用了什么材料和方法，如何分组对照，研究范围以及精确程度，数据是如何取得的以及经过何种统计学方法处理；结果部分要列出研究的主要结果和数据，有什么新发现，说明其价值及局限，叙述要具体、准确，并需给出结果的可信值和统计学显着性检验的确切值；结论部分应简要说明、论证取得的正确观点极其理论价值或应用价值，是否值得推荐或推广等。说白了，摘要就是你文章的骨架。
告诉你一个懒人的办法：第一句写目的，也就是你这篇文章要解决的问题和提出这个问题的原因，然后是“本文通过……的方法，阐述了……，论证了……，得出了……”记得摘要最好200字左右为宜，不宜过长。
摘要
赖尔在《心的概念》中毫不讳言自己的心理学是行为主义的，但他的行为主义不同于传统的行为主义。首先，构成这个行为主义的基本概念如心灵、行为，并非我们已经熟知的那些概念。因此，其研究的身心关系属于另外一个领域，如要准确的表达这种关系，应是向性与智力行为的关系。其次，赖尔曾明确指出，向性的逻辑状态既非定言也非假言，所以不能用“语义行为主义”或“语言行为主义”来框定它。通常认为，他试图把关于向性的陈述还原为有关行为的假言命题，这种观点是错误的。再者，传统的行为主义是一种关于他心的认知理论，但赖尔的行为主义没有这种限定。至今延续下来的解释版本有“本体论或形而上学的行为主义”、“方法论的行为主义”、“折衷论的行为主义”等，它们仍存在各种疏漏和错误，且互相不能达成一致。
历史教训说明，只有先确定与赖尔中期的哲学兴趣相符的问题域或心理学视野，才可能为行为主义做进一步定位。赖尔中期致力于建立一种常识的心理学以服务于哲学治疗，这种心理学在风格上介于胡塞尔现象学与实用主义之间，试图以心灵的给予性来消除一切二元对立与矛盾。《心的概念》的哲学兴趣表现为，试图集中处理两个彼此相关的问题，即传统行为主义深陷领域-范畴混淆的泥沼，如何能够实现一种哲学的治疗以及如何建立一种“哲学的行为主义”.
赖尔的行为主义不仅具有方法论的意义，也具有本体论的意义。方法论的行为主义包括两个层面的内容，即由行为到心灵的验证和由心灵到行为的推论。
传统行为主义将心灵的验证与事实的验证相等同，并在多数情况下以假定的物理过程替代推论层面的真实情况。为了实现两方面的治疗，赖尔以向性模型来揭示心灵验证的特殊逻辑，又以有关“知道怎样”的视野分析来澄清推论层面的事实。相应的本体论同时涉及世界本体论和心灵本体论。前者的基本观点为，世界只有一个，即生活世界，它以向性行为为基本单位，以行为的存在方式为自身的存在方式。后者的基本观点为，心灵不是实体，心灵的活动也不可被看作过程或事件。它作为行为的潜能，必定在世界之外。
Abstract
In The concept of mind, Ryle holds nothing back when he confess that hispsychology is behaviouristic. However, his behaviourism is different from traditionalbehavourism. First, those basic concepts constituted this kind of behaviourism, suchas “mind” and “behaviour”,are not the same as those we have recognized. Therefore,the relationship between physical and mental which it attempt to investigate shouldbelong to another field. And if to be exact,that is the relationship between dispositionand intelligent behaviour. Second, Ryle had said that the logical state of disposition isneither categorical not hypothetical,so we cannot call it “semantic behaviourism” or“linguistic behaviourim” for framing. It is said that he intends to reduce alldispositional statements into hypothetical propositions, this view cannot be true. Lastbut not the least, traditional behaviourism is a sort of theory in its account of ourstanding of other minds,but Ryle's behaviourism is not restricted in the same account.
The explanatory versions which have continued till today,such as “ontological ormetaphysical behaviourism”, methodological behaviourism,,, Eclecticbehaviourism“ and so on,still have various omissions and mistakes. They alsodisagree with each others.
We have learn from these historical lessons that,only by finding out the problemdomain or the scope of psychology which fits with mid-Ryle's philosophical interestscan we positioning his behaviourism further. Mid-Ryledevoted. to set up apsychological method of common sense for philosophical treatment. Thispsychological method attempt to clear up all sorts of opposition and conflict thatdualism arouse, the style of which can be estimated between of Husserl'sphenomenology and pragmatism. The philosophical interests of TheConcept of Mindcan be illustrated as that, it intends to deal with two interrelated questions: how toactualize a philosophical therapy for traditional behaviourism which has sunk deepinto field-category mistake,and how to set up ”philosophical behavourism“.
There is also further research suggesting that Ryle's behaviourism has not onlymethodological significance but also ontological significance. The methodologicalbehaviourism contains two main contents: validation of mind by behaviour, inferenceof behaviour by mind. The traditional behaviourism equates validation of mind withverification of fact and substitutes assumed physical process for the true situation atinference level. To meet the treatment needs of both sides, Ryle try to uncover thespecific logic of validation by showing the model of disposition,and clarify the factat inference level by analyzing the scope of ”knowing how“. Ontologicalbehaviourism involves ontology of world and ontology of mind. The majorviewpoints of the former can be concluded as follows. There is only one world exists.
The one is the world of everyday life that,treating the dispositional behaviour asbasic unit of which, as existence of behaviour as its existence. The major viewpointsof the latter can be concluded as follows. Mind is not entity, its activity cannot berecognized as occurrence or events. As potency of behaviour, it must lie outside theworld.
